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Abstract
In a standard portfolio choice between a risky and a safe asset, we
study the eﬀect of imposing premia and penalties conditional on the
realized return of the portfolio meeting a given threshold. We show that
thresholds set at ”intermediate levels” have the eﬀect to increase the
optimal share of the safe asset, while very low and very high thresholds
may induce larger shares of the risky investment if a condition on the
curvature of the utility function holds.
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1 Introduction
In many economic and ﬁnancial instances, the choice between a risky and a safe
asset may involve premia and penalties that are conditional on the ex post re-
alization of the portfolio. Examples include remuneration schemes that involve
incentives based on realized sales, or stock option plans for CEOs sensitive to
reputation or career concerns, see [1],[2]). Such premia and penalties may have
an eﬀect on the way agents optimally allocate resources (time, money, eﬀort)
between assets characterized by diﬀerent degrees of risk. In this note we in-
vestigate this issue in the framework of a stylized model of optimal portfolio
choice with one safe and one risky asset, and in which investors receive a bonus
if the realized return of the portfolio exceeds a given threshold, and a penalty
if the realized return falls short of the threshold. We compare the optimal
share of risky asset with and without the threshold (that is, in a standard
portfolio problem), to ﬁnd that the threshold eﬀect is to decrease the share
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of the risky asset as long as it is set not too far from the expected return of
the optimal portfolio in absence of thresholds. When the threshold is set at
high levels that are still reached (in the good state) by means of very risky
portfolios, the choice of the investor may involve a larger share of risky asset.
When the threshold is set at a level which is met in neither or both states of
the world, the eﬀect of the threshold on the share of risky asset is ambiguous,
and ultimately depends on the curvature of the utility function.
2 The Model
Consider the traditional portfolio choice faced by a risk averse agent who al-
locates a given amount of money m between two assets, one safe with rate of
return 1, and one risky, with per unit return given by (1 + δH) > 1 with prob-
ability p and (1− δL) < 1 with probability (1 − p). We denote by α ∈ [0, 1]
the share of m that is invested in the risky asset. The random return from
the α-portfolio is given by: mH (α) ≡ m (1 + αδH) with probability p and
mL (α) ≡ m (1− (αδL)) with probability (1 − p). The expected utility from
the α-portfolio is:
Eu (α) = [(1− p)u (mL (α)) + pu (mH (α))] . (1)
where the Bernoulli utility function u is assumed increasing and strictly
concave.
3 Portfolio Choice Without Bonus and Penalty
The optimal portfolio α∗ solves the following maximization problem:
max
(α∈[0,1])
Eu (α) (2)
Under mild assumptions on the Bernoulli utility function u we can rule out
corner solutions with α = 1 and α = 0. Assuming internal solutions, we obtain
the following ﬁrst order conditions:
pδH
(1− p)δL =
u′L
u′H
, (3)
where we have used the following notation:
u′H ≡ u′(mH(α∗)); u′L ≡ u′(mL(α∗)). (4)
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4 Portfolio Choice with Bonus and Penalty
Consider now the case in which the investor receives a bonus B > 0 if the
realized return of portfolio exceeds some given threshold m¯, and a penalty
P < 0 if the realized return of the portfolio falls short of m¯.
We can deﬁne the following three regions for the choice variable (α), ac-
cording to the realized portfolio return:
Ω1 = {(α) : mH(α) < m¯} ; (5)
Ω2 = {(α) : mH(α) ≥ m¯, mL(α) < m¯} ; (6)
Ω3 = {(α) : mL(α) ≥ m¯} . (7)
Region Ω1 is such that the treshold is never met; region Ω2 is such that the
treshold is met only in the good state of the world; region Ω3 is such that the
treshold is met in both states of the world.
The expected utility associated with these regions are:
E1U¯(α) = (1− p)u (mL (α) + P ) + pu (mH (α) + P ) (8)
E2U¯(α) = (1− p)u (mL (α) + P ) + pu (mH (α) + B) (9)
E3U¯(α) = (1− p)u (mL (α) + B) + pu (mH (α) + B) (10)
Note that the maximization problem leading to an optimal portfolio choice
is now discontinuous at all points on the frontier of the above regions. The
next propositions establish conditions on the threshold level m¯ under which
the presence of bonuses and penalties have the eﬀect of increasing the share of
investment devoted to the safe asset.
Proposition 4.1 Let m¯ ∈ [mL(α∗), mH(α∗)]. Let (α′) solve problem (3).
Then α′ < α∗.
Proof. When m¯ is in the region [mL(α
∗), mH(α∗)], any increase of α above
α∗ has the eﬀect of leaving the portfolio in the Ω2 region. We can therefore
check whether α′ > α∗ can possibly satisfy the FOC of the modiﬁed portfolio
problem:
pδH
(1− p)δL =
u′(m(1− δLα′) + P )
u′(m(1 + δHα′) + B)
(11)
Given that u′′ < 0, P < 0 and B > 0, and given that α∗ satisﬁes the FOC of
the original problem:
1
2
u′HδH =
1
2
u′LδL, (12)
we obtain that α′ < α∗.
Let us now consider the case in which m¯ /∈ [mL(α∗), mH(α∗)] .
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Proposition 4.2 Let m¯ < mL(α
∗). Then if u′′ is increasing (that is, de-
creasing in absolute value), then α′ < α∗.
Proof. Consider the FOC of the modiﬁed problem in the region Ω3, which
is attained for small variations of α around α∗:
pδH
(1− p)δL =
u′(m(1− δLα′) + B)
u′(m(1 + δHα′) + B)
(13)
Given that u′′ is assumed increasing (decreasing in absolute value), and
given FOC (3), u′(m(1 − δLα∗) + B) > u′(m(1 + δHα∗) + B). This implies
that (13) is satisﬁed by a level α′ below α∗. A fortiori, an increase in the risky
asset is not proﬁtable when it brings the bad state into the penalty region.
Note that the above proof implies that when u′ is decreasing, condition
(13) can be satisﬁed by increased shares of the risky asset above α∗.
Let us then turn to the case in which the threshold is larger than mH(α
∗).
It is now possible that the optimal α′ may exceed α∗ so to take advantage of
the bonus in the good state of the world. This happens when m¯ is achievable
by means of a large enough share of the risky asset, that is when m¯ < (1+δH).
When this is not the case, things turn out to depend, again, on the curvature
of the utility function, as we show in the next proposition.
Proposition 4.3 Let m¯ > mH(α
∗). If (1 + δH) > m¯ then the optimal level
of α′ may exceed α∗. If (1 + δH) < m¯, then α′ < α∗ when u′′ is decreasing
(that is, increasing in absolute value).
Proof. When (1+ δH) > m¯ then the share of the risky asset may increase
with respect to α∗ in order to beneﬁt from the bonus B, which is still in reach
for large enough α′. When (1 + δH) > m¯, the proposition is proved along
symmetric and opposite arguments used in proposition 4.2, noting that the
bonus B is replaced by the penalty P in equation (13).
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